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Two cases involving alleged contracts to make a will were
passed upon by the South Carolina Supreme Court in the period
under review. No new principle of law appears in either and the
decision in each turned upon the facts.
In the first of the cases, Brown v. Graham,1 the plaintiffs
alleged that they were illegitimate children and that their father
had contracted to devise certain land to them but had breached
his contract by devising the land to his wife, who in turn had
left the land by her will to the defendants. The prayer was for
specific performance. The master found for the plaintiffs, but
was reversed by the trial judge. The supreme court affirmed the
holding of the trial court. The pivotal issue in the case was
whether a contract had been made; the master found that there
was a contract, the trial court and the supreme court held that
there was not.
The South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that, even if
there had been a promise or agreement, it must have possessed
all the essential elements of a contract to justify a finding that
a contract had been made. Further, the court adverted to the rule
that in an action to establish an alleged contract to make a will,
the burden is upon the claimant and that the ordinary rules in
civil actions demanding only a preponderance of the evidence do
not apply to actions to enforce a parol contract to make a will-
that "such contracts are regarded with suspicion and will not be
sustained unless established by definite, clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence, a higher degree of proof than is necessary in
the usual civil case."'2 The plaintiffs did not meet these re-
quirements.
The second case, Hayes v. IsraeZ,3 is somewhat more complex
than the first in that it involved an alleged contract by husband
and wife to make mutual irrevocable wills. The plaintiff, seeking
specific performance, alleged that he and his wife had agreed,
by way of contract, to make irrevocable reciprocal wills and that
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d 421 (1963).
2. Id. at 493, 131 S.E.2d at 422.
3. 242 S.C. 497, 131 S.E.2d 506 (1963).
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such wills had been made, but that the wife without notice to
him had revoked her will and by another will had left her prop-
erty to the defendants, subject to a life estate in the husband in a
portion of certain land. The answer to the complaint by the only
defendant who answered contained a general denial and a plea
of the Statute of Frauds. Both the master and the trial judge
found, from the facts, that a contract was made between the
plaintiff and his wife and specific performance was allowed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.4
In reaching its result the court followed its earlier holding
in Looper v. Whitaker5 that the fact that husband and wife
make reciprocal wills is not sufficient in itself to constitute proof
that they were made pursuant to contract, and it reiterated the
rule that:
[W]hen an oral contract to make mutual wills is relied upon
it is necessary that such contract be established by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence which carries irresistible
conviction to the mind that such a contract actually existed
and that the parties thereto understood and acquiesced to
its terms.
Reviewing the evidence, the court, in affirming, must have con-
cluded necessarily that the plaintiff met this high standard of
proof; yet the statement appears that:
[I]n equity cases, findings of fact by a master concurred in
by a Circuit Judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless
4. The opinion, while noting that the Statute of Frauds had been interposed
as a defense, makes no further mention of it, since the appellant did not advance
it as a ground of appeal and limited his appeal to the question of the existence
of a contract. The master had concluded that the execution of his will by the
plaintiff was such part performance as would remove the case from the statute,
under the authority of Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S.C. 559, 35 S.E. 757, 76 Am.
St. Rep. 580 (1899), and Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192 (1923).
There was no exception to this holding, and the statute is accordingly not
mentioned in the trial court's decree. The authority of Turnipseed v. Sirrine is
questioned in White v. McKnight, 146 S.C. 59, 70, 143 S.E. 552 (1928). Its
value is particularly doubtful since, while the testatrix there whose will had
been revoked in alleged breach of contract had owned land at the time her will
was made, she owned none at her death-a fact which, the court pointed out,
made the 4th section of the statute relating to the transfers of interests in land
inapplicable; and its remarks as to part performance related to the 17th section
of the statute affecting sales of personal property. In Stuckey v. Truett,
which was not a case of mutual wills, a husband had orally promised his wife
that if she would devise her property to him, he would thereafter will it to
her family. She died leaving a will under which her property went to her
husband, but the husband failed to carry out his agreement. It was not the
mere making of the will by the wife but the fact that she had actually left the
property in reliance on her husband's promise that was treated as part per-
formance.
5. 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957).
1965]
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it is shown that such findings are without evidence to sup-
port them or are against the clear preponderance of the
evidence."
And again, in concluding, this statement:
When the foregoing testimony is taken into consideration
along with the circumstances under which the wills were
made, this Court cannot say that the findings of the Master,
concurred in by the Circuit Court, are without evidentiary
support or against the clear preponderance of the evidenceJ
It is at least arguable that the rule as to concurrent findings falls
far short of, and is incompatible with, the rule, in cases of this
kind, which calls for "irresistible conviction.""
Trusts-Discretionary Powers
In Page v. Page9 the question in issue concerned the exercise
of discretionary powers by a testamentary trustee. The will gave
the residuary estate to a named trustee:
[T]o be expended for any emergent needs of my son, Kermit
R. Page [the plaintiff], and my three grandchildren ...
the Trustee to be the judge of the necessity of paying out
any of said funds. This is to provide against any misfortune
to my said son that would incapacitate him as a provider for
himself and his family, or any unforeseen happening to any
of one said children that would make necessary any expenses
that my said son could not reasonably meet.' 0
6. Hayes v. Israel, 242 S.C. 497, 500, 131 S.E.2d 506, 507 (1963).
7. Id. at 502, 131 S.E.2d at 508.
8. In Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1944), which was an
action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to make a will, the
court rejected concurrent findings of the master and the circuit judge, because
in the majoritys view the requirement of strict proof was not met. Confronted
with the rule as to concurrent findings, which was expressed particularly in
Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897, 105 A.L.R. 102 (1935), Mr.
Justice Stukes, speaking for the majority, said (p. 27):
I have not undertaken to state all of the lengthy testimony. I repeat that
a reading and rereading of it leaves me unconvinced of the truth of respon-
dent's allegations, certainly as to the degree of conviction necessary in
such a case. Perhaps if it were an ordinary equity appeal from con-
current factual findings of master and judge, and uninfluenced by errors
of law, my view would be different and I could conscientiously agree to
application of the rule of Alderman v. Alderman. ...
9. 243 S.C. 312, 133 S.E.2d 829 (1963).
10. Id. at 314, 133 S.E.2d at 830-31. The transcript of record setting out the
will shows that the concluding portion of the item in which the quoted language
appears provided that upon the death of the plaintiff the "unexpended balance
that may be on hand" should be equally divided and paid over to the grand-
children as each reached twenty-one. Record, p. 28.
[Vol. 1"7
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The trustee named did not accept the trust and the First Na-
tional Bank of Myrtle Beach in substitution administered the
trust. It paid taxes and insurance on property devised by the
same will to the plaintiff. The bank subsequently merged with
the South Carolina National Bank of Charleston, which placed
a different construction upon the will and refused to pay taxes
and insurance as its predecessor had done. This action was there-
upon brought against the plaintiff's children and the trustee
bank seeking a construction of the will so as to direct the trustee
not only to pay the taxes and insurance then due but also to pay
all the future income to the plaintiff. The complaint alleged in
substance that the plaintiff's financial condition was such as to
justify the relief which he asked. The trustee's contention in
answer was that the language of the trust did not warrant the
use of the trust funds as the plaintiff demanded. The lower
court held in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff-direct-
ing the payment of taxes and insurance and ordering future
income to be paid to him--"since to do so would be in the best
interest of all the individual parties to this suit and since it
could in nowise affect the defendant trustee.""1 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed.
The court, after pointing out the distinction between manda-
tory and discretionary powers, characterized the powers under
the will in suit as discretionary, pointing particularly to the
language "the trustee to be the judge of the necessity of paying
out any of said funds." It further declared that a trustee cannot
exercise an arbitrary discretion and that the sanctioned discre-
tion is controlled by the intent manifested in the language of
the trust. Since the expenditure of trust funds was limited to
circumstances which, in the trustee's judgment, constituted a
"misfortune" producing an "emergent need," there necessarily
was discretion in the trustee to determine the existence of such
circumstancs. The court thereupon undertook to define "misfor-
tune" and "emergent needs"-the substance being that they do
not embrace "happenings which are recurring and foreseeable
in the ordinary course of events but rather refer to an event or
circumstance which might not occur and which was not reason-
ably foreseeable or anticipated at the time of the will's ex-
ecution."
1 2
11. Record, p. 32, Page v. Page, 243 S.C. 312, 133 S.E2d 829 (1963).
12. Page v. Page, supra note 11.
1965]
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In the light of these principles the court concluded that there
was no abuse of discretion, under the facts, in the trustee's failing
to pay the taxes and insurance-which were foreseeable and
recurring items-nor in its resistance to the plaintiff's demands
for payment of all future income to him, and that the trustee
having thus acted in good faith the court would not interfere.
Further, the court observed, the plaintiff was seeking the court
to substitute its discretion for that of the trustee. This, the court
said, it could not do, and "'the mere fact that if the discretion
had been conferred upon the Court, the Court would have exer-
cised the power differently is not a sufficient reason for inter-
fering with the exercise of the power by the trustee.' ",s
Finally, the court declared that "the burden is not upon the
trustee to show good reasons for its actions but rather is upon
those who question its actions to prove an abuse of discretion,"14
and that the plaintiff had failed to carry the burden by showing
that the plaintiff's "claimed lack of financial resources is insuf-
ficient or unavailable due to any 'misfortune' which would re-
quire the trustee to alleviate an 'emergent need' such as to war-
rant this Court granting the relief sought on the grounds that
the trustee had abused its discretion."1 5
Purchase Money Resulting Trusts
In the period under review the South Carolina Supreme Court
had before it two cases involving purchase money resulting trusts
and in each the attempt of the claimant to establish such a trust
was unsuccessful.
In the first of the cases, Hodges v. Hodges,16 the plaintiff
sued her husband for divorce and also asked that she be declared
to be equitable owner of a one-half interest in real and personal
property in the husband's name. With respect to the claim of
ownership the plaintiff asserted in the complaint that she had
13. Ibid. Quoting from II SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 187 (2d ed. 1956).
14. Page v. Page, supra note 11, at 317, 133 S.E.2d at 832.
15. Ibid. No point is made in the case as to the propriety of exercising
discretionary power by a successor trustee. It must have been assumed on both
sides that the power could be exercised by one succeeding to the original
trustee. In his will the settlor named a trustee and provided for a substitute.
The original trustee, as the case discloses, did not accept the trust; no mention
is made of the named substitute, but apparently there was no acceptance here
either. Unless the discretion vested in the named original and substitute trus-
tees was intended to be personal to them, the power would of course pass to
successors in the office. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 196 (1959). Cf.
Singleton v. Cuttino, 105 S.C. 44, 89 S.E. 385 (1916).
16. 243 S.C. 299, 133 S.E2d 816 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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contributed money toward the purchase of a house under an
agreement with her husband that title was to be taken in their
joint names, but that she had learned just before the suit that
title had been taken by the husband solely in his name. The
master's finding was that the plaintiff, under the facts, was not
entitled to a divorce, nor was she entitled to a resulting trust.
The circuit judge reversed the master in both respects, and he in
turn was reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
agreed with the findings of the master.
The court, noting that the master and the circuit judge had
disagreed in their conclusions, proceeded to determine the ques-
tions according to its own view of the evidence, and it gave con-
sideration to the fact that the master had observed the witnesses
and so on. The court, in the light of the rule that "the evidence
required to establish either a constructive or resulting trust must
be clear, definite, unequivocal and convincing," 17 determined that
the evidence was "clearly insufficient" to establish a resulting
trust in the wife's favor. Referring to the now well known case
of Green v. Green,'8 the court stated the applicable rules as
follows:
Concisely stated, in order for a resulting trust to arise, such
must arise, if at all, at the time the purchase is made. The
funds must then, or prior thereto, be advanced and invested.
A trust will not result from funds subsequently furnished.
Authorities quoted there support the proposition that, in-
curring an absolute obligation to pay, as a part of the orig-
inal transaction to purchase, at or before the time of convey-
ance, may suffice, in lieu of actual payment. 19
Without going into the evidence, it is sufficient to say that the
court determined that the wife did not meet the test of payment
at or before the time of acquisition of title by her husband or of
any obligation to pay; and, in fact, the court declared that it was
"led to the conclusion that it was highly improbable that any of
her funds of any consequence went even indirectly into the pur-
chase of the real property."20
17. Id. at 306, 133 S.E.2d at 819.
18. 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583 (1960).
19. Hodges v. Hodges, 243 S.C. 299, 306-07, 133 S.E.2d 816, 819-20 (1963).
20. Id. at 308, 133 S.E.2d at 820. No particular issue was made as to the
personal property. A division recommended by the master was accepted.
The treatment of the alleged trust throughout the case was on the basis of
a purchase money resulting trust. In view of the allegation in the complaint
and the attempted proof that the husband had promised to take title in the
1965]
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In the second of the cases, Stevens v. Stevens,21 the plaintiff
was an estranged husband who sought to establish a resulting
trust to the extent of a one-half interest in real property, title
to which was in the name of the defendant, his wife. His conten-
tion was that he had contributed fifty per cent of the cost of the
property and improvements, with the understanding that he and
his wife would each own a one-half interest. The defendant's
principal contentions in answer were that the property was paid
for largely out of her own earnings, and that contributions made
by the husband were a gift.
The master, to whom the case was referred, found that the
plaintiff failed to establish his claim by the necessary high de-
gree of proof. The findings of the master were upheld by the
circuit court. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court pointed to the rule that
the claimant of a purchase money resulting trust has the burden
of establishing the trust by clear, definite and convincing evi-
dence. Keeping in mind the principle that concurrent findings
of master and judge in an equity case would not be disturbed
unless unsupported by the evidence or against the clear weight
of the evidence, the court reviewed the extensive testimony and
agreed with the conclusions below. The court stated that assum-
ing the plaintiff had contributed fifty per cent or more towards
the purchase of the property and its improvement:
[S]ince the conveyance was made to his wife for whom he
was under a legal obligation to provide, the presumption is
that his contribution towards his purchase thereof was a gift
to her. While such presumption is one of fact and not of law
and may be rebutted by parol evidence or circumstances
showing a contrary intention, it is of itself a circumstance
sufficient to raise an inference that a gift was intended and
joint names of himself and his wife, it is equally appropriate-probably more
so-to term the consequent trust, if the facts warranted, a constructive, rather
than a resulting, trust. If the husband, occupying as such a confidential re-
lationship to his wife, promised to buy the property in their joint names, the
breach of the promise by taking title in his own name could well be said to give
rise to a constructive trust. The requirements for payment of definite sums
at particular times would not necessarily come into play. See discussion of this
problem in the survey article on Green v. Green, Karesh, Wills and Trusts,
1960-1961 Survey of S.C. Law, 14 S.C.L.Q. 227, 264 n. 84 (1962). In any event,
since the proof to establish a constructive trust must be clear and convincing,
it is fairly plain from the evidence that the wife did not meet the required
degree of proof to establish that kind of trust and would have been equally
unsuccessful from that point of attack.
21. 244 S.C. 113, 135 S.E.2d 725 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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to cast the burden upon the one seeking to enforce a resulting
trust, here the plaintiff, to prove that he did not intend to
make a gift to his wife. The presumption of a gift also ap-
plies to improvements made by the husband upon property
which he knows belongs to his wife.
22
The efforts of the plaintiff throughout were of course largely
directed to an attempt to overthrow the presumption of a gift,
but, without relating the evidence, it is enough to say that he
did not convince the court-just as he had not convinced the
master and the circuit court-that he did not intend a gift to
his wife. The plaintiff's explanation for having title placed in
the name of his wife was that he wished the family home to be
secure against judgments that might be obtained against him
in his occupation as a locomotive engineer-he was aware that
judgments had been obtained against railroads and engineers
jointly. On this the court remarked that, if the plaintiff's version
was true:
[I]t is apparent that title was placed in the name of his
wife as a gift so as to relieve the property of any obligations
that he might create in his business and thereby promote the
family security. If this was his purpose . .. it could have
been accomplished only by divesting himself of every sem-
blance of title. It must be presumed that he intended that
the conveyance to his wife would accomplish such purpose.
28
The court further observed that the fact that the parties had
thereafter fallen into discord could not change the legal effect
of the original transaction-it could not change the gift into a
trust.
22. Id. at 117, 135 S.E2d at 727.
23. Id. at 118-19, 135 S.E.2d 727-28. The husband who buys property in his
wife's name of course takes a calculated risk. In the first place, as here, he is
faced with the presumption of a gift, which is difficult to overcome. If, in order
to safeguard the family home against future creditors, he makes a gift in this
fashion to his wife, a subsequent marital rift will find his wife quite naturally
holding on to the property; and there is the not infrequent case of the wife
devising the property away from her husband or permitting it through intestacy
to pass in part to her relatives. On the other hand, if it is demonstrated that
the wife was to hold the property in trust, the purpose of handling the property
in this way would be defeated if creditors of the husband sought to reach the
property, since, being his equitably, it would be available to them. And if there
were no creditors attempting to pursue their claims against the property, a wife
who had in fact agreed to hold the property in trust might successfully contend
that the purpose being to conceal the husband's ownership equity should not
enforce the trust-either as an express or a resulting trust. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRuSTS §§ 63, 444 (1959) ; Annot., 117 A.L.R. 1464 (1938). Cf. All
v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 20 S.E.2d 741, 159 A.L.R. 997 (1942).
1965]
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Finally, in his appeal the plaintiff asked the court to overrule
or modify the principle that the presumption of a gift arises
when a husband pays the purchase price for property taken in




The Statute of Descent and Distribution 25 was amended by
the 1964 General Assembly by addition of the following :216
(11) Whenever any person shall be presumed dead by
reason of disappearance or long unexplained absence under
the common law rule in this State and such person shall have
been unmarried at the time of such disappearance and when
last heard from, then such person shall further be presumed
to have died intestate, unmarried and without issue.
Apparently the purpose of the amendment is to state a defini-
tive rule of presumptions in the facts mentioned. So far as the
presumption of intestacy is concerned, the provision appears to
follow general law.27 It is not clear whether, before the amend-
ment, there was a presumption or not of marriage following the
disappearance of one known to have been unmarried at the time,
although it may be implicit in the case of Still v. Hutto28 that
24. It has been noted that the court declared that in order to establish a
resulting trust the plaintiff must establish such a trust by clear, convincing and
definite evidence. In a case where the presumption of a gift-not a trust-
arises from payment of the purchase price, the claimant has a two-fold
burden: first, to show the payment of the purchase price or a definite portion,
and, second to show facts to overthrow the presumption of a gift. Unquestion-
ably he must show by such clear and convincing evidence the fact of payment,
but apparently this case requires him also by the same kind of proof to rebut
the presumption against him. On this latter point there is some diversity of
opinion, and it has been urged by a high authority that such a rigid degree
of proof should not be required. III ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 443 (2d ed.
1956). On aspects of the problem locally, see Karesh, Wills and Trusts, 1959-
1960 Survey of S.C. Law, 13 S.C.L.Q. 96, 109 n. 25 (1960) reviewing Privette
v. Garrison, 235 S.C. 119, 110 S.E.2d 17 (1959), which the court in this case
cites as requiring a high degree of proof, and, which, like this case, involved
a claim by a husband.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52 (1962).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52 (11) (Supp. 1964), S.C. AcTs & J. RES. 1964,
No. 938.
27. 16 Am!. JuR. Descent & Distr. § 56 (1938); 26A C.J.S. Descent & Distr.
§ 2, at 519 (1956).
28. 48 S.C. 415, 26 S.E. 713 (1896). The syllabus states the proposition:
"Where a man leaves the State unmarried and childless, and has not been
heard from for seven years, he will be presumed dead, but it will not be pre-
9
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there is no presumption that he remained unmarried. Equally,
if not more, important, this case states that there is no presump-
tion that the party had no issue even though he was unmarried
when last heard from. The amendment obviously is intended to
change the rule of this case and to place the burden upon the
one asserting the fact of marriage, or issue or both.29 The change
brings the rule into conformity with the view of the majority of
courts.80
Adopton-Inheitance
The 1964 General Assembly enacted a comprehensive adoption
law,31 the details of which are by now known to the members of
the bar. Relevant to this area of the Survey is the portion of the
act dealing with succession by and from adopted children. The
then current section regulating inheritance-section 19-52.1 of
the South Carolina Code, 1962, was, with other statutes, specifi-
cally repealed. The applicable section embraced in the new law
provides in part as follows:
Section 12. After the final decree of adoption is entered,
the relation of parent and child and all the rights, duties
and other legal consequences of the natural relation of
child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted
child and the person adopting such child and the kindred
of the adoptive parents. From the date the final decree of
adoption is entered, the adopted child shall be considered
a natural child of the adopting parents for all inheritance
purposes, both by and from such child, to the exclusion of
the natural or blood parents or kin of such child. These
rules of inheritance shall also apply to all the parties where
sumed that he died childless, and the party alleging such fact must prove it."
The case involved a will which contained a provision that if a beneficiary died
without child or children the property was to go in a certain way. Obviously,
most cases would involve intestacies. Under the rule in this case, given the
disappearance of a person for a sufficient period to raise a presumption of
death, collateral heirs of such a person who was last known to be unmarried
and childless would be faced with the practically impossible burden of proving
their right to the inheritance, even though no spouse or descendants of the
missing party were known to exist to make a claim in opposition to theirs.
29. As to a woman who had disappeared, the important question in a case
might be not whether she had married and had had children but only whether
she had had children-since illegitimate children can inherit from the mother.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-53 (1962).
30. 26A C.J.S. Descent & Distr. § 81, at 719 (1956).
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one of the natural parents is united in bonds of matrimony
to the other adopting parent.
Unlike earlier statutes which at least placed in doubt adoption
of adults, the new law-section 17-permits such adoptions, but
in such cases sections 1 through 12 of the act do not apply, ex-
cept that if the court finds it to the best interests of the persons
involved, a decree of adoption may be entered which shall have
the legal consequences stated in section 12. It is not quite clear
whether a decree of adoption of an adult person will auto-
matically and in itself produce the consequences of section 12,
or whether the decree must in specific terms so provide.
Another relevant feature of some importance is that the new
act contains an express repealer of section 10-2587 of the Code,
which contained a restriction, somewhat ambiguous, upon the
amount that an adopted child who was illegitimate could take
from the estate of the adoptive parent.
Reverting to section 12, it will be seen that its provisions are
far-reaching. How far it goes beyond the section which it re-
pealed-section 19-52.1-is difficult to assess because of some
uncertainty in the language of the repealed statute, which has
not been construed judicially since its enactment in 1954.32 If the
language of section 12 means what it seems to mean, the adopted
child is to be treated as removed from the bloodstream of his
natural parents and placed into the bloodstream of his adoptive
parents. An exception would seem to exist where the adoptive
parent is married to the natural father or mother of the child-
the child would not be removed from the bloodstream of the
natural parent. If, for example, a widow with a child married,
and the stepfather adopted the child, the tie between the child
and the deceased father's family would be severed but not the tie
between the child and his mother and her family. This assump-
tion appears, however, to be at odds with the concluding sentence
of section 12, but it could surely not be intended that, in the case
suggested, the child would not inherit from the mother or her
relatives.83
Although it is not stated specifically that the adopted child
shall inherit from his adoptive parents, or they from him, or that
32. S.C. AcTs & 3. REs. 1954, No. 698.
33. Compare the provision on this point in the repealed statute (§ 19-52.1):
"provided, however, that where one of the natural parents be united in bonds of
matrimony to the other adopting parent then in such event the rules of in-
heritance as above set out shall attach as said child were the natural child of
both such parents"-the proviso following an exclusion of the natural parents.
[Vol. 17
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he shall inherit from the kin of the adoptive parents, or they
from him, it seems reasonably clear that these are necessary im-
plications from the broad provisions in the act that for all in-
heritance purposes the adopted child is to be regarded as a nat-
ural child, that the legal consequences of the natural relation of
parent and child shall exist between the adopted child and the
kindred of the adoptive parents, and the exclusion of the kindred
of the natural parents. Admittedly these are only assumptions
whose validity must await judicial determination.8 4
Some hypothetical cases may be suggested in the light of these
assumptions:
(1) A is the adopted child of B. B dies survived by A. 0,
brother of B, dies intestate. A would take, although he is not
related by blood to C.
(2) A is the adopted child of B and C. B and C die. B has a
brother D. A dies. D would take.
(3) A and B are children of C and D, both deceased. A is
adopted by X, and B by Y. A dies. B would not take.
(4) A is the child of B. B abandons A. A is adopted by C.
B dies. A does not inherit from B.
(5) A is adopted by B and C. D is adopted also by B and C.
B and C have a natural child E. A dies. D and E inherit from A.
(6) A is adopted by B and C. D is also adopted by B and C.
B and C have natural children E and F. E dies. A, D and F take
from E, although A and D are not related by blood to E, and F
is. (Compare the situation of the brother of the half-blood who
is excluded by the brother of the whole blood. See next example.)
(7) A is adopted by B and C. B and C have a natural child D.
B) by an earlier marriage, has a child E. D dies. A, not related
by blood, would exclude E, who is related to D by blood and is
in the same degree as A. (The resolution of this incongruity
would be to eliminate the distinction between kindred of the
whole and half blood, which has produced abnormal results in
situations other than adoptions.)
(8) The same as in (7) except that A dies. E would be ex-
cluded by D.
(9) A is adopted by B, child of C. B dies. Thereafter C dies.
A inherits from C, although no act of C brought A into the
family.
34. For annotations on the subject and analysis of the various statutes, see
Annot.. 37 A.L.R.2d 333 (1954); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1955).
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(10) A is adopted by B, child of C. B dies. Thereafter A dies.
C inherits from A.
The case examples given involve intestacies and of course there
can be many variations. In the area of testate succession, the fac-
tual situations would not be as numerous. It may be assumed
without strain that "all inheritance purposes" would embrace
succession by will as well as by intestacy, and that "legal conse-
quences" would, in context, likewise embrace it. Some supposi-
titious testacy cases, based on the stated assumptions, are also
suggested:
(1) T by will makes a gift to A, his adopted child. A has a
natural child B. A dies before T. There is hardly doubt, under
both the old and the new law, that B will take from T under the
Anti-lapse Statute.3 5
(2) T by will makes a gift to A, his natural child. A adopts
B. A dies before T. It is probable that under the law as it existed
prior to the 1964 act, B would take from T under the Anti-lapse
Statute. The same, perhaps a greater, probability exists under
the new law.
(3) T by will makes a gift to A, his natural child. Thereafter
T adopts B. Under both the old and the new law B will partici-
pate in the gift to A as a pretermitted child taking by staute38
Constructional questions may present more difficulty. For
example, the constructional rule is that a gift to the children of
a third person is, in the absence of a contrary intention, exclusive
of adopted children. 7 Whether the legislation will affect the
rule is problematic. Similar questions may arise as to gifts to
such persons as "descendants," "issue," "heirs," "heirs of the
body"--whether these classes relate to the testator or third per-
sons. It is evident also that like problems will arise in inter vivos
transfers employing the same terms.
Jurisdiction of Probate Courts
The present South Carolina constitutional provision as to the
jurisdiction of probate courts is article 5, section 19, as follows:
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-237 (1962), See Annot., 15 A.L.R. 1265 (1921).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-236 (1962). See Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C.
408, 172 S.E. 426 (1934), applying the statute to a case where testator provided
for an adopted child after the will adopted another child; the latter was treated
as an after-born child and permitted to take. See Annot., 105 A.L.R. 1176
(1936); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1159 (1951).
37. Annot., 70 A.L.R. 621 (1931); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 670 (1943).
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The Court of Probate shall remain as now established in the
County of Charleston. In all other Counties of the State
jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of administra-
tion, in business appertaining to minors, and the allotments
of dower, in cases of idiocy and lunacy, and persons non
compos mentis, shall be vested as the General Assembly may
provide, and until such provision such jurisdiction shall
remain in the Court of Probate as now established.
By joint resolution s" the 1964 General Assembly has proposed
an amendment to be submitted for approval in the ensuing gen-
eral election which would amend the provision by substituting
the following:
Jurisdiction in matters testamentary and of administration,
in matters appertaining to minors and to persons mentally
incompetent, shall be vested as the General Assembly may
provide, and until such provision and jurisdiction shall re-
main as now provided by law.
It is evident that the most noticeable change is to strip the
Probate Court of Charleston County of its seemingly privileged
-though in reality unprivileged-position as the only constitu-
tional court in the probate system, and to make it as amenable
to the authority of the legislature as the probate courts of the
other counties. 39 The effect of the amendment, if adopted, would
be to make general legislation affecting the probate courts uni-
formly applicable throughout the state and to dispel doubts con-
cerning the application of such legislation to the Charleston
court. With the change, that court will have taken from it what-
ever unique judicial prerogatives may have remained from the
period prior to the adoption of the 1895 constitution, but, more
importantly, it will be afforded legislatively conferred powers
which might be denied to it under the present version of the
constitution which seems to lock in its powers to those existing
at the time of adoption. The fate of the amendment may have
been decided by the time this Survey is published.
38. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1964, No. 1079.
39. For comments on the constitutional and non-constitutional status of
probate courts, see Karesh, Probate Court Jurisdiction Over Testamentary
Trusts, 2 S.C.L.Q. 13 (1949), and particularly, as to Charleston County, pp.
17, 18, n. 6.
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